ANALIZYNG THE BIGGEST DRUG BARON IN HISTORY (Life of Pablo Escobar)

Estimados lectores, a continuación les hago conocer la historia de Pablo Escobar uno de los hombres más conocidos y odiados del mundo, por ser en su momento el narcotraficante más influyente y poderoso en la historia del narcotráfico, este trabajo se presento dentro de un programa de Maestrías y fue elaborado por el Dr. David Velasquez quien tienen un Master Degree en Justicia Criminal y es además criminólogo teórico y analista  criminal, el trabajo muestra desde el comienzo de la existencia de Pablo Escobar hasta su ultimo día,  analizando sus sociopatías desde el punto de vista criminologico, se que esta en Ingles en próximas entregas lo traduciremos en Español, es un trabajo muy impresionante y muy ilustrativo que estoy seguro encontrará interes en estudiantes, abogados, criminologos, sociologos, psiquiatras y muchos profesionales afines. Espero lo disfruten.

Dear lectures,

This is the story of Pablo Emilio Escobar, being one of the most ruthless capo of of the entire world. This research was complete by Ph.D leaner David Velasquez while doing a part of his Masters in Criminal Justice. This investigation commence since the day the ruthless capo was born until the last days of his life. Within the reserach we will show his sociophatic behavior. This report is very illustrative and impresive, I can assure you that you will find it intersting for students in criminla justice fields as well as attorneys, and sociologist, I hope you enjoy it.

Como siempre estaremos gustosos de sus comentarios.

If you have any coments please fell free to share it with us.

Analyzing the Biggest Drug Baron in HistoryDavid VelasquezCriminological TheoryNovember 16, 2012

Abstract

By the late 1980s, Colombia turned into the world’s primary manufacturer and exporter of cocaine, along with the most vital coca producing countries in the Andes. In the perspective of the War on Drugs, U.S. assistance to the country augmented meaningfully through this era, and by 1991, Colombia was the foremost receiver of U.S. support in Latin America. Even with the upsurge in U.S. funds, Colombia’s military experienced a sequence of significant setbacks to protruding guerrilla units, which were observed as main players in the cocaine traffic, as well as a severe menace to political constancy in the country.  The function of this essay is to analyze the theory of differential association by Edwin Sutherland, beside with structural strain theory by Robert K Merton. I, Furthermore, included analysis of surveys, which challenge the test of rationality of Sutherland’s theory and Merton. Theoretical Criminology tries to describe speculations of why and how delinquency happens by inspecting the numerous details connected to illegal performance and crime. These theories suggest the sociological, psychological, and psychiatric opinions about the reasons of crime and other methods of abnormal behavior. Among these is a set of theories denoted to as learning theories, which emphasis on the notions and actions that can be cultured, the procedures by which the learning transpires, and the structure of collaboration and reassurance for law violation. Maybe the toughest and most conspicuous of these theories is Edwin Sutherland’s Differential Association theory. As an intern actionist of sociology, Sutherland’s perspective on the etiology of crime was a particular procedures or associations that could clarify most transgression, in spite of its great mixture.

Analyzing the Biggest Drug Baron in History

In a small town of Rio Negro close to the city of Medellin Colombia on December 1st 1949, the ruthless Capo was born as Pablo Emilio Escobar Gaviria. The son of a laborer farmer and a school governess, there was nothing in Escobar’s upbringing to recommend the dramatic and astonishingly sociopathic course his life would pursue. While he was properly well-educated, he under no circumstances had a status as a bright intellect. Reasonably, like Al Capone, his key “ability” was an unrestricted ability for violence.(The Biography Channel website. 2012)

When scarcity compelled Escobar to withdraw of Antioquia’s small-town university in 1966, he commenced to steal vehicles and smuggling marijuana, which he became a millionaire at 22. Next he financed his wealth in the blossoming cocaine industry, dominating local coca manufacture by disbursing laborer farmers twice the going percentage and capitalizing in coca agriculture in an isolated highland valley of Peru and Bolivia, far from feeble dominant governments.(Bio. True Story, 1996)

Coca, kickbacks, and assassination pushed Escobar to the top statuses of the Medellin crime outlook. Here he encountered Jorge Luis Ochoa Vasquez, who’d by now had set up a small range of trafficking and delivery setup in south Florida before going back to Colombia to construct his clansof cocaine handling operation in 1977. Now their enterprise permitted Escobar to increase their distribution. At the moment, the Colombians were still blocked out of the U.S. cocaine traffic by Cuban smugglers who hired “mules” (frequently airline travelers or flight attendants) to transport moderately insignificant amounts of the drug into south Florida, where it was retailed to mid-level suppliers employed with the American Mafia.(Medellin Cartel Background Guide, 2012)

The Cuban trafficking cartel was definitively disintegrated by a third Colombian, Carlos Lehder Rivas, operating with George Jung, an American drug smuggler. Whereas being cellmates in Federal penitentiary in the mid-1970s, Jung and Lehder arranged strategies to fly cocaine into the U.S. inside of a single-prop Cessna’s, permitting them to do away with untrustworthy “mules” and transport much greater quantities of cocaine. In 1977, their first trip of 250 kilograms wholesaled for roughly $15 million, enticing the interest of their contractors, who were considering shipping extra cocaine to the U.S. — a lot more.(Justicia US Law, 1992)

Now the final section fell into place. With Lehder involved, Escobar had the resource, handling, and trafficking capability to upkeep mass selling in the US. On a usual trip, Lehder and Jung hovered from Bahamas to Escobar’s estate in Colombia on Friday, go back to the Bahamas Saturday with 300-500 kilos of drugs (cocaine), and then mingled into the Sunday urgency of planes transporting weekend travelers returning to the U.S.(Justicia US Law, 1992)

The proceeds were enormous at every step. Every kilo made by Escobar’s lab during 1978 cost him $2,000 dollars, which wholesaled to Lehder and Jung for $22,000, netting Escobar $20,000 per kilo. In the next phase they shipped around of 400 kilos to south Florida (acquiring some extra costs in hush money for local airport permissions) where mid-level suppliers paid a general price of $60,000 per kilo; thus in 1978 every 400-kilo cargo grossed Escobar $8 million and Lehder, Ochoa, and Jung $5 million each in proceeds. Obviously, the mid-level sellers did just reasonable: after chopping the drug with baking soda each consignment sold on the street for $210 million, virtually ten times the purchase amount.(Justicia US Law, 1992)

Almost immediately Lehder was contracting American aviators to fly a solid flow of cocaine into the U.S., compensating them $400,000 per expedition. At least, it was one tour per week, in 1978 this interpreted into a wholesale proceeds of $1.3 billion and earnings of $1 billion. That time Escobar, Ochoa and Lehder together they financed a 2,000 man guerrilla to protect their common interests, commemorating the official commencement of the Cartel of Medellin. Apparently, a conference of colleagues, the Cartel had just one physical leader — El Patron, “The Boss,” or El Padrino, “The Godfather” — revealing Escobar’s authoritarian character in the supply chain as well as his absolute mercilessness. It was a smooth group organized of at least 17 sub-groups (involving two sub-cartels operating Cali and Colombia’s north coast), which worked separately, so merely the superiors distinguished what was actually going on. A mixture of a mafia dynasty and a Fortune 500 company, it’s not penetrable, nebulous structure that disillusioned investigation by defending the chiefs from prosecution and overwhelming outsiders who could only venture about its factual size.(The Biography Channel website., 2012)

By 1982, Escobar’s individual wealth exceeded $3 billion, establishing him the wealthiest man in Colombia, but his immeasurable greed took him to ever-bolder conspiracies. He procured a convoy of vintage DC-3s, DC-4s and DC-6s to transport greater loads, and the distribution timetable changed into even more frenzied reminder Vice President George Bush to growl to the Bahamian Prime Minister whom the movement of vehicles at Norman’s Cay was “like O’Hare.” He also invested in the appointment to Colombia’s Congress and utilized his diplomatic passport to assume a family trip in the U.S. (including a presumptuous tour to the White House and an unusual visit to Graceland to pay respect to his icon Elvis Presley).(Medellin Cartel Background Guide, 2012)

Within the period of March 1982, there was a confiscation of two tons of drugs (cocaine) at Miami International Airport, which stunned U.S. officials, who understood that they are facing a considerably bigger operation than anything witnessed before. Nevertheless, they still didn’t familiarize of the Cartel’s entity making Escobar being continually one or two steps ahead. By the time U.S. investigation arrived, it forced Lehder to abandon Norman’s Cay in September. Escobar had previously sham a new alliance with Panamanian tyrant Manuel Noriega, and the task didn’t miss a beat. From the time of 1982-1984, most of the cargos have increased from 80 tons to 145 tons, overflowing the U.S. market and generating wholesale charges to descent from $60,000 per kilo to $16,000. However, cash flow continued irrational with profits of $3 billion in 1982 and $2.3 billion in 1984, clearing Escobar exclusively at least $1.3 billion in proceeds. Around this time, he had acquired a Learjet to transport money out of the U.S. By this time the Cartels was expending $2,500 per month for just rubber bands to be used on the bricks of cash.(The Biography Channel website., 2012)

Escobar hired a group of 10 full-time accountants to manage all his businesses, so he could be able to relax. In one incident, he could discount $5 million because it was stuffed on the wrong boat — “you win some; you lose some” — somehow; he also acknowledged a typical loss of 10% of his returns to “spoilage,” adding up to $500 million per annum consumed by rats or decomposed due to inappropriate storage. Escobar’s private wealth was assessed at $7-$10 billion during 1985. Of which maybe $3 billion was in Colombia, with the remainder was circulated into numerous international bank accounts and investments such as a penthouse in Miami, hotels in Venezuela, and near to one million hectares of estate in Colombia.(Medellin Cartel Background Guide, 2012)

The highest potential the Cartel of Medellin had was during 1985. In precisely ten years he subdued America. As the amount of individuals who’d experimented with cocaine at least once it quadrupled to 25 million tons of drugs, meanwhile the figure of habitual users escalated from one million to six million. People from North Americans used approximately 150 tons of the white powder (cocaine) during 1985, producing $30 billion of profits for mid-level traders and $6 billion for the Cartel. The DEA discovered full-time traders in twelve out of fifteen locations on down town Manhattan. Corruption procured all over 10% of Miami’s police force were on Escobar’s payroll, as were high-ranking characters from the FBI, DEA, Customs, IRS, INS and CIA.(Medellin Cartel Background Guide, 2012)

However, this is dimmed in relation to Medellin’s manipulation in South America, where it occupied as many as 750,000 citizens and managed 40%-50% of entirely exportations from Colombia, Bolivia and Peru. The biggest preparing facilities were areas with their individual schools and health centers. During March 1984, the Colombian police force in helicopters arrived on Tranquilandia. There was a structure of 19 labs dispersed throughout the 1,200 square miles of tropical forest from southeast of Bogota, which was approachable exclusively via air. It had eight landing strips along with residence halls for hundreds of laborers plus its own hydroelectric power source, private roads, and a fleet of vehicles. Somehow, in 1985, the special police unit dismantled 667 labs and 90 landing strips but hardly made a dent to the entire production.(Frontline PBS, 2010)

Corruption was everywhere in 1985, close to 400 magistrates were on the payroll and by 1989; the attorney general was looking into 6,000 cases of crookedness in the police and military. As the preceding Colombian President BelisarioBetancur stated, “We are up in contrast to a consortium stronger than the nation” Escobar also obtained public perspective by creating schools, churches, soccer fields and free dwellings for tens of thousands of poor people.US attempts to procure Escobar to be extradite, and it generated an all-out war among the Cartel and the government of Colombia. In 1988-1991, the Cartel assassinated Colombia’s attorney general, the small-town governor and police chief of Antioquia, an alternate nominee for president, Luis Carlos Galan, and a substitute Minister of Justice. Escobar additionally instructed the bombardments of El Espectador and another prime newspaper, Van Guardia Liberal, murdering four; Avianca Flight 203, exterminating 110 (but not the predetermined objective Galan’s successor Cesar Gaviria Trujillo); and secret police headquarters, murdering 50 and destroying various city blocks.(EncyclopediaBritannica, 2010)

To conclude the influence of intimidation the government consented upon not to deport Escobar if he spent five years in a minimum-security confinement — in spite of the fact that “no-security” might be additionally precise as he was permitted to construct his own penitentiary.  A self-indulgent complex was nicknamed “Club Medellin” where he kept overseeing his Commonwealth as previously (And just to be protected, he also corrupted adequate amount of legislators to abolish the extradition agreement with the U.S.)(Encyclopedia Britannica, 2010)

However, in July 1992, Escobar definitely proceeded too far, killing four high-ranking dealers with connections to the growing self-determining cartel de Cali. Citizen’s outburst with forced from the government to do something about it, but Escobar evaded sooner than the army could move him to an authentic penitentiary Now Escobar was obviously on the defensive attitude pursued severely by the Colombian state police and armed forces with reinforcement from the CIA, the U.S. Armies of “Delta” force, and U.S. Navy Seals. The enraged Cali Cartel also turned on Escobar, collaborating as a defendant crew formed by the families of Escobar’s casualties labeled the PEPES (Perseguidospor Pablo Escobar) whose exclusive intent was retribution. In short; the entire planet yearned for Escobar death, and it was only a matter of time.(TRIPOD, 2010)

Unhindered by legal distinctions, the Cali Cartel and the PEPES assaulted Escobar’s relatives associates and revenue murdering 300 relatives and business partners. Then on December 2, 1993; Colombian police obstructed a phone discussion with his son who distinguished his whereabouts in a Medellin home unit block. Outgunned, Escobar ventured to escape via the rooftops, where he was escorted down by a shower of bullets. Pablo Emilio Escobar Gavira at 44 years old was killed, he was accountable for the massacres of 40 magistrates 200 court officials, 1,000 officers and 3,500 private citizens some opinions put the overall as high as 60,000.(TRIPOD, 2010)

Throughout the history of criminological concept, countless hypotheses on crime causation have been revealed.  One of this is Edwin Sutherland’s theory of differential association, which alleges that criminal performance is enlightened through participation with others or societies. In 1939, Sutherland released his book labeled principles of Criminology third edition, in which he summarized his viewpoints on the hypothesis of differential association. However, Sutherland restricted the differential association theory to illustrate career delinquents and methodical criminal behavior. This experimental hypothesis of criminal behavior is arbitrated on the frame of the seven succeeding propositions. (“International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences,” 1968)

We now have to view at what hypothesis can be employed for Pablo to describe his behavior. Firstly, glancing at the social learning theory it is conceivable that Pablo cultured various of his conduct from others. In the social learning theory, an individual determines criminal behavior by way of correspondence and upbringing. Pablo did get into some inconvenience while he was an adolescent. He began to shoplift, car theft, and bringing illegally coca paste (Chepesiuk, 1999). When reasoning the methods Pablo became into a drug baron, he used to employ intimidation. With this theory, we can convey some hypotheses of how his adolescent life was all about. When he was a teenager running around his surroundings of Engivado he probably was an acquaintance with other underprivileged youngsters. Throughout his upbringing with these fellow’s operatives, he most likely established that perpetrating crimes paid off in the end.  However, by developing this hypothesis for Pablo, we encounter that as a youth he did have a decent education, and he was not underprivileged in anyway; his mother was a schoolteacher (Grajales, 2007), and his father was a farm laborer. With that state, it is under the assumption that he educated in his criminal methods through social learning.

I do not agree that Pablo just one day had the urges to sell drugs, and steal cars, etc…. Pablo undoubtedly had his ups and downs while he was an adolescent but why would he alter to violent misconduct? Some of the offenses he committed before he began to sell cocaine were misdemeanors and child-like offenses. This in alteration induces me to exercise the social learning theory, because, in fact, he was cultured from others of his surroundings. Through powerful educational abilities Pablo Escobar got to be the “Don” of Colombia. After enlightenment in finding ways to become a flourishing criminal, he had to learn the procedures of delinquencies; He understood that he needed it motives to drive him to execute them. He, consequently, discovered that being a criminal is advantageous. This is not just a possibility it was his fate to develop into the most powerful drug lord.(Chepesiuk, 1999)

In the meantime, Robert K Merton constituted the structural strain theory as an attachment of the functionalist relation on deviance. This assumption summarizes the fundamental part of deviance to the struggles that are encouraged by the opening between cultural objectives, and the resources of individuals been expressionless when accomplishing those targets.  Although there is an additional theory that can justify Pablo a little more, this hypothesis is the strain theory. Pablo was not very well-off when he was teenager. His relative was pre-dominating working-class family that made enough for the nourishment and to put a roof over his head (Bio. True Story, 1996). This was a “strain” on Escobar. The strain theory primarily states that if an individual cannot encounter lawful ways of making money, or other products, they will determine a delinquent path to do so, and most likely accomplishing. Well, Pablo did manage to be suitable, rich and high-powered but only after he discovered paths to circumvent the law, or methods to alter them without getting captured.(Agnew, 1992)

Pablo employs his ring of bandits to subdue most of Colombia let alone the North American with the cocaine business. Due to the fact, he was short of funds; this made a struggle on him throughout his younger years. He constantly expressed that he yearned for becoming the president of Colombia one day, well finally he discovered a way to do it (Chepesuik, 1999), He didn’t turn out to be president, but having an assembly seat created him untouchable. His group assassinated sixty-five men of the Colombian police force in order to preserve Pablo’s cartel in action. Pablo would do whatever at any expense for authority and resources. This conveys to the deduction that social learning, and strain theory could be wrapped into one to illustrate why Escobar was who he was.(Akers, Krohn, Lanza-Kaduce, &Radosevich, 1979)

However, there must be three theories. So the tertiary assumption that I found associates to Pablo as the self-control theory. I had selected this one as third, since I truthfully believe that the two theories illustrated before do make comprehensible sense. After considering at the time I determined that Escobar had no self-control over his behavior. Pablo was incapable of applying a socially bearable means of “self-control”. I suppose this is since he realized he was the greatest drug baron of the world. Unquestionably, Pablo had to apply logic with his common sense. Except that, his analysis was modified since he experienced who he was. I suppose you could claim that his self-esteem got a hold of him. I also perceived that when I was investigating concerning Pablo that most of his photographs are of him in a happy state of mind. Even though he understood what he was doing was unlawful he was having a pleasant time.(“International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences ,” 1968)

Etiology

As an intricate consequence of isolation prejudice and unfairness we observed the origin in for the phenomenon of sicariato. Such a theory which can only be interpreted as ‘hit man ship’, originates from the Spanish phrase sicario (hit man); alternatively, as determined by the thesaurus of the Royal Spanish Academy: a “salaried killer.” Such a curiosity had a considerable effect during the 1980s in the most marginalized surroundings of Colombia, all whereas being promoted and exploited by drug dealing and other law breaking societies having been at the time.(Carvajal, 2011)

Sicariato is an unlawful institution which appointed assassinations to be conveyed in order to deal with unsettled disagreements, and terrorize specific segments of society to punish or silence those who publicly denounced such illegal activities. Various drug dealers, as well as other people practiced and disciplined ordinary offenders (in most cases under the age of 18), to convey this assignment.(Carvajal, 2011)

Such lethal associations can be somehow be connected by the necessity of various adolescents to find nourishment and vocations as well as to numerous other complicated circumstances of the Colombian State and its tradition, particularly that of the sector of Antioquia, where the town of Medellin is situated. The reasons that drove countless adolescents to get implicated in this category of venture with such a low opportunity of survival will establish the foundation of the research of this essay. Furthermore, we have investigated the motives for the source of sicariato in the urban area of Medellin, which has come to be recognized as Metrallo in the vocabulary list of these merciless killers, for whom their country and society are in no way else but an additional representation of aggression and extermination in Colombia.(Carvajal, 2011)

Supporting Ideas

A remarkable explanation behind this inconvenience is that the mass media generally characterizes the principles and ways of living of the middle upper class in Colombian and global civilization as unfamiliar to the youngsters in the comunas of Medellin. They are demonstrated with a distinction they cannot accomplish with the resources; they have been frequently attainable. As a result, they do not contrast themselves with their friends but to the wealthiest in society, or occasionally a fictitious norm and a style of life that may not even subsist other than in the media. From such speculating, we can then perceive why people who are underprivileged from reaching a burdened social objective in this occasion due to financial reasons, are hence distinctly possible to offer the crime. Since teenagers are indeed within the age group that can be the most influenced by the media and the consumption patterns it portrays, sicarios can be seen as a group of youngsters deeply frustrated by their inability to attain the (material) goals imposed by our society, who turn to homicide to resolve those conflicts. As stated by Robert Agnew, the “gap between one’s anticipations and accomplishments may affect not only in disillusionment but also in indignation or even rage”. (Agnew, 1992)

This complex phenomenon, which was born in the poorest neighborhoods in the case of Medellin, provided employment to thousands of kids who were shown how easy and quick it was to make money and raise their social status by frequenting drug barons who would be squander their earnings by paying good money in return for the annihilation of their enemies in the most brutal ways possible. This mafia tradition circulated even further the significance of physical use implanting nouveau-riche merits such as the value to purchase brand commodities value one’s notion over anything else by way of the infliction of overstated styles while at the same time, it supported the thought that being rich is worth doing anything to come by.(Agnew, 1992)

Prediction and Prevention

Escobar constructed his illicit empire to such a magnitude that he ultimately administers about 80% of the drugs ship to North America. Escobar was able to manage the Colombian specialists towards a no deportation article and award forgiveness to drug barons in trade for giving up the drug trade.

Supporting Ideas

In 1982, Pablo was designated as a delegate spokesperson to the” Chamber of Representatives of Colombia’s Congress”(Madellin Cartel Background Guide, 2012), as an element of the Liberal Party. During the 1980s, Escobar came to be recognized inter culturally as a drug lord; the Medellin Cartel monitored a large share of the cocaine that penetrated insidethe United States, Mexico, Puerto Rico, and the Dominican Republic with drugs brought strictly from Peru and Bolivia, as Colombian coca was originally of low grade quality. Escobar’s merchandise arrived in various other countries usually nearby the Americas; however, it is revealed that his organization reached as far as Asia. Corruption and terrorization distinguished Escobar’s negotiations with the Colombian technique. He had an efficacious unavoidable guideline in dealing with the police and authorities from the government; It was directed as “plata o plomo,”(Medellin Cartel Background Guide, 2012) (literally silver or lead, colloquially receive money or confront bullets). This culminated by losing hundreds of people as well as civilians, policemen and state officials in the hands of the Cartel de Medellin. At the same time, Escobar corrupted innumerable government agent judges and other statesmen.  At the time of the blockade the Supreme Court was considering using the constitution of Colombia’s of the extradition agreement with the U.S. designated as a deputy representative to the Chamber of Representatives of Colombia’s Congress, and a division of the Colombian Liberal Party.(Medellin Cartel Background Guide, 2012)

Escobar was accountable for the murder of the presidential aspirant Luis Carlos Galán, along with the executed contenders who was all struggling in the same election, as well as the blasting of Avianca Flight 203 in which 107 honest citizens perished because he needed to assassinate just one individual who was not on board and also the attack over at the DAS headquarters in Bogotá in 1989. The drug lords of Medellin were implicated in dangerous cocaine battles against their fundamental competitive the Cali Cartel. (Justice Dept., 2010)

At one time, the dubious Escobar supported the 1985 assailing of the Colombian Supreme Court by guerrillas. Another para-military organization known as M-19 was involved in the massacre of half the magistrates at the court in Colombia. Many of the affirmations were incorporated in a late 2006 article concerning some judges at the present Supreme Court. He mentioned his involvement in the fight for the override of the 1979 American-Colombian Extradition agreement.(Justice Dept., 2010)

Recommended Criminal Justice Responses

The United States really amplified their density on Colombia to extradite Escobar. There was increasing public distrust as to the backgrounds of his massive wealth and American authorities considered duty-bound to examine further.

Supporting Ideas

In 1984, the Medellin cartel came presuming with a recommendation to the authorities. The “extraditable”  volunteered to pay out the national debt, discontinue drug manufacture, trafficking, and invest the illegal money in National development programs in replace for exoneration to criminal prosecution and submission to the United States. This recommendation was contemplated but eventually refused by the government due to political aristocracies and the ethics to the public.(Richani, 2011)

After the political execution of the Minister of Justice Rodrigo Lara Bonillo (who was accountable for commencing one of the first crusades in contrast to the drug commerce), the government carried out the extradition agreement endorsed with the United States. Four unimportant drug sellers were dispatched to the US for hearings. However, the extraditable induce a campaign opposing the negotiation by the government, and it came out with the phrase better a grave in Colombia than a jail in the USA. Despite an intermediate nationalist encouragement throughout the campaign, the government has persisted aggressively supporting the treaty. Medellin has answered with bloodshed of the unreserved treaty supporters. Last year, the anti-narcotics authorities collaborated with the DEA to repatriate a top drug baron Carlos Ledher.(Richani, 2011)

The United States has long knowledge summoning cartels, and our accomplishments have originated substantial outcomes. In the fiscal year that terminated on September 30, 2006; the Division conveyed thirty-three cases implicating breaches of the Sherman Act and associated federal statutes, and obtained a total forfeitures of larger than $473 million, compensation of more than $2 million, and guilty verdicts for nineteen individual offenders adding up 5,383 days of a jail term. Before I converse on many motives for the determination of our program, let me tell you some facts about our investigations and prosecutions, and the penalties we have sought.(“Dept. of Justice,” 2009, p. 3)

Investigations: at present, there are roughly 130 sessions of grand juries looking into speculated cartel activity. Worldwide cartel inquests report shows close 50 percent of the Antitrust Division’s grand jury inquiry. The subjects and targets of the Antitrust Division’s international investigations would reveal in six continents and perhaps in an approximately twenty-five distinctive nations. However, the geographic range of the delinquent venture is even extensive than these sums reflect. Our investigations have exposed rendezvouses of intercontinental cartels in more than hundred cities and thirty-five nations involving the majority of the Far East and practically every nation in Western Europe.(Masoudi, 2007, figure III)

Cartels Prosecuted: The Antitrust Division has indicted global cartels in regions with businesses, including vitamins, textiles, construction, food, feed additives, food preservatives, chemicals, graphite electrodes, fine arts auctions, ocean tanker shipping, marine construction, maritime transportation services, rubber chemicals, synthetic rubber and dynamic random-access memory that had injured firms and Cartel’s billions of dollars per annum.(Masoudi, 2007, figure II)

Fines Imposed: Approximately, $1.38 billion in criminal forfeitures inflicted by the Antitrust Division cases throughout the five years. More than ninety percent were encumbered in relationship with the criminal prosecution of worldwide cartel actions. In forty-five court cases out fifty the Antitrust Division has obtained a corporate forfeiture of $10 million or greater; the shared offenders were foreign stationed. These sums demonstrate the fact that the classic intercontinental cartel probable resides in the U.S. and with adversaries companies in many places in Europe, Asia and throughout the world.(Masoudi, 2007, figure II)

Jail Sentences: The Antitrust Division always speculated that the most efficient path to intimidate and discipline cartel offensive activity is to inflict jail sentences on fellows who execute them. In June 2004, the United States intensified the Sherman Act to an extremity jail time from three to ten years. In the 1990s, the typical jail decree for offenders indicted by the Antitrust Division was less than a year. In recent years the penalty has doubled to almost two years of incarceration. Within the past five years, the Antitrust Division has given more than 125 years of confinement been imposed to drug’s offenders. Approximately, forty-one offenders are encountering incarceration of one year or longer.” Foreign offenders from Canada, France, Germany, Japan, South Korea, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom have been accused for being connected in the cartel ventures, and at the moment they are serving a prison sentence for transgressing U.S. antitrust laws in US penitentiaries.”(Masoudi, 2007, figure II)

The best motivator of our accomplishment is our Corporate Leniency Program. Under this program, the first collective cartel associate who comes expeditiously to the Antitrust Division and collaborates with our inquiry and measures up to the conditions of our program will obtain an assurance of total exoneration ­not only for the organization but also for any contributing parties. The Antitrust Division’s Corporate Leniency Program is the finest derivation of cartel confirmation and has functioned as exemplary programs to be accepted by antitrust jurisdiction all over the world. Our knowledge with cartel personnel has instructed us that cartels generally are excessively money making for those who participate in them, and it is very strenuous to disclose cartel conduct but once disclosed we start to accumulate effective substantiation to victoriously prosecute cartel associates in court. The Antitrust Division should be able to considerable accomplishment by merging active criminal prosecution with our leniency program in order to an upsurge, the probability of cartel detection.(Masoudi, 2007, figure III)

To be fortunate, a leniency program ought to be furnish a significant advantage as contrasted with the optional planning’s of remaining in a cartel or removing from but stay silent. This demands both extreme punishments and a legitimate dismay of detection. If syndicates detect that the chance of being trapped by antitrust authorities is very insignificant hardened maximum retributions will not be adequate to discourage cartel action or to provoke corporations to notify their law-breaking to officials in replace for amnesty. Once the reliability risk of awareness exists, the threat of being turned in by a fellow corporate that can be an upsurge. It is also very useful to have a distinctive leniency policy, which produces the capacity for an immunity group among a corporation and its own responsible workers. Ultimately there must be a resemblance and clarity to the program. This provides possible candidates a high degree of confidence that, if they take the chance of coming forward, they will receive compensation. Transparency in a leniency program gives a better probability that aspirants will give in and the cartel will be crushed up.(Masoudi, 2007, figure III)

The Antitrust Division’s leniency program employs some unique appeal to anti-cartel enforcement: it furnishes outstanding enticements for organizations that select to self-report antitrust activities (e.g., release from delinquent prosecution for the snitch and its agent), but this immunity is attainable purely to the first offender walking towards the door and on specific circumstances (e.g., it is not valid to syndicate heads and demands full report and trustworthy collaboration). The essential is that just one company can be considered for clemency. If a syndicate does not come forward to the prosecutor regardless of the time or circumstances, they will not be acceptable for pardon. Any other organization can attempt to collaborate and may enroll a plea agreement and have its punishment minimized. However, this protocol does not have anything to do with our leniency program. This predicament induces apprehension and skepticism among the cartel associates. In this way, the program can function as to impede cartels from creating or to impair them by provoking members to snitch towards each other and rush to get a deal from the government.(Masoudi, 2007, figure III)

Nearly all corporate offenders in an intercontinental cartel case are transnational businesses marketing numerous products. It will come as no astonishment then to comprehend that the company are mending costs for one commodity market and should be doing in different areas. The Antitrust Division have accomplishment investigating tactics of cartel profiling, in which one inquest can ultimately give a foundation to prosecutions in increasing distinctive markets. In fact, approximately half of the grand jury at present is being looked into speculated cartel activity where instituted as an outcome of confirmation attained as a result of an investigation of an entirely separate market.(WilmerHale, 2009)

For example, new inquiry ensues when an organization turns to the Antitrust Division to bargain a plea agreement in an ongoing inquest regarding illegal operations and then strives to obtain more lenient treatment by furnishing to reveal the entity of a second distinct scheme. Under this condition’s syndicates that pick to self-report and collaborate in a different issue can acquire what is recognized as “Amnesty Plus.” In such a case, the organization will welcome amnesty that is unconditional immunity for the syndicate and its collaborating workers in relation with that additional conspiracy. Besides the organization they will accept a considerable extra reduction by the Antitrust Division in measuring a suitable forfeiture for its involvement in the first conspiracy.(WilmerHale, 2009)

Amnesty Plus encourages institutions that are already under inquiry to clear house and inform any infractions in other businesses in which they may be implicated. Companies that decide not to obtain assistance of the Amnesty Plus opportunity endanger severe repercussions with the Antitrust Division’s guidelines. If an organization contributed in an alternate antitrust offence and does not inform it, and the action is later uncovered and victoriously prosecuted, where applicable the Antitrust Division will recommend the punishing court to meditate on the organization and any reliable boss.  Failure to inform the behavior will be willingly as an exacerbating burdensome factor. We will aim for a forfeiture or jail ruling at or preceding the upper end of the convicting guidelines’ latitude. Furthermore, were numerous convictions take place, a company’s or person punishing calculations may be augmented founded on the previous criminal record? In one new Penalty Plus case, the Antitrust Division inquired the judicial system to enforce a sentence that was considerably more than the sentencing procedures which limits the organization regression as an antitrust transgressor. In that condition, the amount of counterfeit marketing was $17 million; the company paid a fine of $12 million and three of its executives were carved out of the plea bargain. If the syndicate had informed the behavior when it had the opportunity in relation with the earlier criminal prosecution it would have spent no penalty and its bosses who now are liable to be prosecuted, would have (if they collaborated) not be granted a complete amnesty protection.(WilmerHale, 2009)

For the Cartel, the negligence to be self-report under the Amnesty Plus program may compromise the diversity between a possible forfeiture as high as eighty percent or greater than the capacity of counterfeit dealings versus no damages at all on the Amnesty Plus product. For the person, it could imply the distinction between an extended jail verdict and evading incarceration altogether. As an outcome of the Antitrust Division’s Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus procedures organizations comprehend that they could not furnish to endure deliberately inexperienced by confining the latitude of their inside investigations. The dangers to the organizations and their organizers are too extreme.(WilmerHale, 2009)

Finally, concerning global participation, I should concentrated on how we do things in the United States; it is significant for all of us here to take an Annotation of the struggles and triumphs of the cartel prosecutions in different territories are there  since the advantages of cartel enforcement across boundaries are strong. Over the past, a number of years there have been a flourishing international agreement that worldwide cartel enterprise is far reaching, and it terrorizing industries and people everywhere. The remarkable accomplishment of the Antitrust Division’s leniency program has produced an extensive involvement worldwide. In particular, various countries are backing the Antitrust Division’s well-known carrot-and-stick reach and improve volunteer exposure programs to compare our leniency program that recompenses self-reporting, while concurrently striking harder regulations for establishments and executives who forfeit the race for immunity. We have suggested an amount of international governments in composing and enforcing efficient leniency programs in their own territories. As an outcome, nations such as Japan, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Germany, Ireland, Korea and the United Kingdom will proclaimed new or modified leniency programs. The approach in leniency programs can generated it a much easier and better appealing for organizations that at once pursue and obtain amnesty in the United States, Europe, Canada and other jurisdictions where the applicants have publicity.(Masaudi, 2007, figure IV)

One advantage of intensified international cartel enforcement is merely that cartels run a bigger danger of detection with extra prosecutors on the beat. Having associates in other territories, you aimed on criminal enforcement that directs you to a greater accomplishment in the Antitrust Division’s particular prosecutions, with a simpler approach to testimony and witnesses. Adding extra jurisdictions to the list of nations with illicit enforcement in addition it intensifies deterrence since it enhances the expense of entering or continuous being in cartels. We acknowledge that bosses actively involved in organizations in other nations have explicitly determined not to restore values in the United States in order to diminish the danger of being incarcerated there. By expanding the amount of territories that needs to be averted cause’s cartels to be tougher to manipulate and be less lucrative. Moreover, expanding cartel enforcement globally decreases the amount of safe havens for drug lords who have immersed in cartel offensive activities and contributes firmer enticements for those bosses to acknowledge culpability and collaborate with anti-cartel inquiries.(Masaudi, 2007, figure IV)

Of course, these advantages will flux only if cartels perceive that they will encounter strong prosecution. Such prosecutions are expanding and I am delighted to contemplate the criminal enforcement achievements of other jurisdictions. Antitrust authorities worldwide have turned out to be gradually more hostile in investigating and penalizing cartels that terrorize their clients. The Antitrust Division’s recent victory in prosecuting foreign citizens who have infringed the U.S. antitrust laws that assisted by the varying perspectives globally concerning the detriment produced by cartels and the consequent raised participation contributed by foreign officials.(Masaudi, 2007)

The improved teamwork with foreign law enforcement officials already has granted us with an intensified approach to foreign-located confirmation and witnesses who have verified to be influential in the breaking of several international cartels. For instance, in February 2003, the Antitrust Division, the European Commission Directorate-General for Competition, the Canadian Competition Bureau and the Japanese Fair Trade Commission collaborated in the investigations and drop-in meetings in an abnormal level of participation. More than 250 detectives and agents were implicated in the coinciding introduction of these researches on three continents. This illustrated the beginning of a worldwide cartel examination that had gone visible concurrently in four jurisdictions, but it is no more distinctive for international antitrust officials to converse on investigative plans and to combine searches, service of subpoenas, drop-in interviews and the timing of charges in order to avoid the premature disclosure of an inquiry and the conceivable devastation of proof. Such coordination between multiple territories will resume being an influential part of cartel inquiries, and with that assistance will lead to more productive anti-cartel enforcement in the future.(Masaudi, 2007)

III.      CONCLUSION

Indigence and deprivation of education and love, among other circumstances are indispensable during the evolution and survival as a child. It has conducted numerous teenagers in the comunas of Medellin into becoming genuine instruments of death and devastation. In addition, several other consumerists, vicious, improper, unscrupulous and broad-minded are factors, inflicted by cruel criminals on the Colombian youth. Sicarios have turned adolescents into a widespread of creatures who are meant to fall into the tendency of conveying illicit businesses, such as extortion, drug trafficking and other uncivilized crimes such as murder. Edwin Sutherland’s differential association theory cannot clarify any detailed type of delinquency or unlawful behavior. In fact, maybe the motive why Sutherland’s theory has continued its meaning is because it incorporates a general technique and the essential ideas or way of investigative misconduct and criminal behavior. Unfortunately, the reality is that not each person is intelligent to succeed. There are winners and losers. Merton’s dispute is that the stress from society to attain financial achievement actively shoves individuals (the losers) to perpetrate crimes and therefore, is the reason of deviant.

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